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Overview 
In many scenario simulations performed with integrated assessment models, where the goal is to maintain a 
temperature change below 2oC at the end of the century, negative emissions play an important role, starting in 2050 
and permitting reaching a zero-net emission regime around 2070. The options of choice to produce negative 
emissions are biomass fueled power plants with carbon capture and sequestration (BECCS) and Carbon Direct 
Removal (CDR) technologies, and more precisely Direct Air Capture (DAC).  
The aim of this paper is to explore the long-term relevance of negative emissions generated by DAC and BECCS for 
the attainment of Paris agreement goals. For this purpose we extend to the horizon 2100 a burden sharing model that 
we used to explore climate policies in [1, 2, 3] and we introduce DAC and BECCS activities as part of the strategies 
that different groups of countries can adopt in the long term. In the simulations performed with this extended model 
we can observe the possible impact of the introduction of these technologies on the definition of a fair sharing of a 
cumulative emissions budget.  
Methods 
An objective toward a “good” probability of reaching the 2oC target is to limit the cumulative emissions budget over 
the period 2015 onwards to 800-1000 GtCO2. Therefore, as a consequence of the Paris agreement, all the parties, 
jointly should limit their cumulative emissions to this safety budget. The idea that a climate policy should be 
oriented toward a fair sharing of cumulative emissions has been developed in [1, 2, 3], using a Meta-game model 
that we intend to extend to capture the possible impact of DAC and BECCS technologies. We consider m = 11 
groups of countries, or coalitions, like e.g., E-U, US-Canada, Emerging countries, Developing countries, etc. In each 
group there are several countries sharing similar economic structure. As indicated above, the burden sharing issue 
reduced to the sharing of the safety cumulative emissions budget. To assess the economic consequences of a 
proposed sharing rule, one must assume that an “optimal” use of the global emissions budget will be made, or, at 
least that a “second best” solution should be reached, corresponding to an equilibrium among the parties. For that 
purpose we assume that an international market for emissions permits will be implemented and that the participating 
countries will have full banking and borrowing options to manage their respective emissions budget shares. A 
strategic variable is the supply of permits that each group of countries forming a party will put on the market at each 
time period. The total supply of permits will determine a world price of carbon and emissions abatement levels that 
equate the price to the respective marginal abatement costs in the different parties. This will also determine the 
welfare losses, with respect to a BAU situation, the gains in the terms of trade, and the buying and selling of permits. 
Other strategic variables are the level of activity in DAC and BECCS. Through the use of these technologies, 
countries can generate negative emissions, which replete their respective emissions budgets. At each period, the net 
cost for a coalition is the sum of the welfare losses plus the DAC/BECCS cost minus the gains from the terms of 
trade and the gains (minus the cost) from the selling (buying) of permits. The “second best” solution is obtained by 
assuming that the parties play a Nash equilibrium with payoffs defined by minus the discounted sum of their net 
costs over the rest of the 21st century plus the discounted cost over an infinite horizon of the limit steady state 
solution with zero-net emissions. This equilibrium result will permit a comparison of the relative welfare losses, 
expressed as the discounted sum of GDP losses relative to the BAU situation. In this study we compute fair 
(Rawlsian) burden sharing solutions minimizing the maximum of the relative welfare losses (with a 3% discount 
factor).  
We use the GEMINI-E3 model to calibrate the dynamic game model. GEMINI-E3 is a worldwide multi-country, 
multi-sector, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that has been specifically designed to assess energy and 
climate change policies. GEMINI-E3 is used to compute the CO2 emissions and economic variables within the 
business as usual (BAU) scenario and calibrate the payoff functions. The methodology used to calibrate our game 
theory model using an applied CGE is detailed in our previous papers. In short, various climate policies are 
simulated by GEMINI-E3, then we perform econometric estimations of the abatement cost and gains from term of 
trade functions. However, the time horizon of GEMINI-E3 is limited to the first part of our century (i.e. up to 2050), 
therefore we have to implemented procedure that extend the variables for the years 2070 and 2100. We use a 
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versatile representation based on a steady state growth approach for the end of our century. Potentials and costs for 
DAC and BECCS among regions are based on literature estimates. 
Results 
In this section, we present the preliminary results of four numerical simulations with and without DAC/BECCS 
technologies and for two emissions budgets, ie, 800 and 1000 GtCO2. The following Table gives, for each scenario, 
the emissions allocations equalizing GDP losses among regions, the associated GDP losses and the CO2 prices 
evolutions. Figure below displays the emissions profiles by 2100. 
 
 Without DAC/BECCS With DAC/BECCS 
Budget (in GT) 800 1000 800 1000 
Budget share 
USA           8.6% 9.5% 11.9% 12.1% 
EUR           10.0% 9.8% 8.3% 9.5% 
CHI           17.9% 18.9% 28.0% 23.7% 
IND           7.7% 7.2% 3.1% 1.9% 
RUS           5.3% 5.1% 0.0% 2.5% 
GCC           4.4% 4.7% 3.1% 5.9% 
OEE           13.3% 13.4% 19.7% 18.7% 
ASI           14.0% 13.5% 9.3% 7.4% 
LAT           3.9% 3.8% 0.0% 1.1% 
ROW           14.9% 13.9% 18.8% 17.2% 
Welfare loss (equalized GDP losses among all countries) 
 3.7% 2.3% 1.4% 1.0% 
CO2 prices in US$ per ton of CO2 
2030 700 446 231 167 
2050 1857 1183 418 301 
2070 4996 3191 753 543 
2100 4859 4551 1778 1268 
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Conclusions 
Our preliminary results demonstrate the importance of considering the potential of negative emissions technologies 
in the design of long-term climate agreements. GDP losses can be divided by a factor higher than 2 (from 2.3 to 
1.0% and from 3.7 to 1.4%) if DAC/BECCS technologies are introduced after 2030. The impact on CO2 prices is 
even larger as DAC/BECCS avoids to implement very expensive abatements to attain a zero-net emission regime 
and allows one to postpone a part of emissions reduction after 2070. Our numerical results also show that countries 
with high potentials of DAC/BECCS (including sequestration) are receiving less allocations (eg, LAT, ASI, GCC, 
RUS) in the design of fair agreements. 
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